Comment on Ontario\u27s Bill 110  An Act to provide for Warranties in the Sale of Consumer Products by Mont, Nadine Cooper
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 11 
10-1-1977 
Comment on Ontario's Bill 110 "An Act to provide for Warranties in 
the Sale of Consumer Products 
Nadine Cooper Mont 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Nadine Cooper Mont, “Comment on Ontario's Bill 110 "An Act to provide for Warranties in the Sale of 
Consumer Products"”, Comment, (1977-1978) 4:1 DLJ 201. 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Nadine Cooper Mont* Comment on Ontario's Bill
110 "An Act to provide for
Warranties in the Sale of
Consumer Products"
I. Introduction
The government of Nova Scotia has recently made some limited
improvements to the law of products liability1 . Merchant sellers are
no longer permitted to contract out of the three basic obligations or
"implied warranties" contained in the old Sale of Goods Act: to
deliver a merchantable article, 2 fit for the buyer's purpose 3 which
corresponds to the description under which it was sold. 4 The
reformulation of these old common law obligations which first
received statutory recognition in 18935, was done in a somewhat
ambiguous and unsatisfactory manner. 6
Of far greater consequence to consumers however, is the fact that
the old products liability rule has been left intact: namely, that a
consumer who wishes to sue under any of these three "implied"
warranties must be in privity of contract with his defendant
supplier. 7 This means that the consumer can only sue an
out-of-privity defendant in tort. When one considers that the
Supreme Court of Canada has recently re-affirmed that there is no
action for economic loss in tort 8, it becomes evident that the
consumer has no legal remedy whatever against an out-of-privity
defendant (typically the manufacturer) who has supplied an
unworkable product. The consumer will only gain admission to
*Nadine Cooper Mont, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1978
1. ConsumerProtection Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 53
2. Sale of Goods Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 274, s. 16(b)
3. Id. s.16(a)
4. Id. s.15
5. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c.71 (U.K.)
6. See H. Kindred, New Consumer Legislation in Nova Scotia (1976), 2 Dalhousie
L.J. 683 at 685
7. Much has been written about this so-called "privity barrier" in the United
States. In the authors' view a case analysis by S.J. Stoljar, written in 1958, still
represents one of the best discussions of this problem in the Commonwealth. The
International Harvester Case: A Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Chattels
(1958-59), 32 Aust. L.J. 307
8. Rivtow Marine v. Washington Iron Works, [1974] S.C.R. 1189; 40 D.L.R. (3d)
530
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court when he was hurt by the defective product or at least where he
alleges that the product has physically damaged another chattel. 9 In
short, the courts require some kind of trauma. Judges are not
concerned with the banality of shoddy or "merely" unusable
goods.
In contrast to the Nova Scotia Consumer Protection Act, 10 the
Legislature of Ontario is currently attempting to control this
extraordinary immunity on the part of out-of-privity suppliers of
defective chattels. While this new Ontario approach to implied
warranties in the supply of goods has defects, it is, for all its
shortcomings, a far more radical and thorough attempt than the
Nova Scotian effort to provide a rational system of liability for
defective goods.
The Ontario bill is relevant in the Nova Scotian context in a
number of respects. It deals with problems that will have to engage
the attention of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission at some
stage. It is therefore likely that the Ontario Bill will serve as a useful
model of what to do, and what not to do in Nova Scotia in
rationalizing the network of liabilities which connect the manufac-
turer, distributor and ultimate purchaser of defective goods. With
this in mind, we will make a number of comments on those
strengths and weaknesses of the Ontario Bill which have seemed
interesting to us.
The explanatory note preceding the Bill isolates three areas of
reform:
1. A statement of implied warranties that apply to every consumer
sale and product, and which denies the ability to contract out of
liability.
2. The extension of responsibility for breach of warranties to the
manufacturer notwithstanding the lack of privity of contract.
3. Certain warranties accompany the goods regardless of resale. 11
Discussion will follow the bill's classification of its contents.
II. The Provisions Relating to Implied Warranties
Section 3(1) of the Bill provides:
9. Ibid.
10. The Ontario proposals have been followed fairly closely, for instance, by the
Saskatchewan Government's Proposalfor Consumer Products Warranties Bill.
11. An Act to provide for Warranties in the Sale of Consumer Products, Bill 110,
Ontario, 30th Legislature, 3rd Sess. 1976
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Where there is a sale of a consumer product to a retail buyer by
description formulated by the retail buyer, there is an implied
warranty by the retail seller that the consumer product conforms
to the description.
It may be questioned: why describe the condition of correspon-
dence to the description as an "implied" condition when the
description forms an express part of the contract? The decision in
Andrews v. Singer L2 make it clear that it is logically preferable to
characterize breach of an "implied" warranty of compliance with
description as the breach of an express condition. It should be noted
that the Proposal For A Consumer Products Warranties Bill in
Saskatchewan accords with this judicial characterization' 3, as does
the Uniform Commercial Code14 and, more notably, the Ontario
Law Reform Commission Report15 itself on whose recommenda-
tions the proposed Ontario legislation is based.
In defining the concept of a sale by description, it is disappointing
to note that Section 3 did not accept the recommendations of the
OLRC and resolve the long standing question as to whether a sale in
a self-service store is included within the purview of the section.
However, on the strength of recent cases here' 6 and abroad' 7, as the
OLRC 18 itself pointed out, one could assume in the consumer's
favor that such sales are in fact sales by description.
Subsection 3 of Section 3 provides as follows:
For the purposes of subsection 2,19 the description of a consumer
12. [1934] 1 K.B. 17; [1933] All E.R. Rep. 479 (C.A.)
13. Section 6(3)
14: Uniform Commercial Code, Art. 2-313(1) (1972 ed.)
15. Ont. Law Reform Commission Report on Consumer Warranties and
Guaranties in the Sale of Goods (Toronto: Dept. of Justice, 1972) at 34 (hereinafter
"OLRC Report")
16. M. Ruud, The Vendor's Responsibility for Quality in the Automated Retail
Sale (1960-61), 9 Univ. Kansas L. Rev. 139
17. See Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co. (1961), 170 Report Series A. 2d 160
(Maine Supreme Judicial Ct.); H. Beecham & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Francis Howard &
Co. Pty. Ltd. [1921] V.L.R. 428 (S.C.)
18. OLRCReportat34
19. (2) Where there is a sale of a consumer product to a retail buyer,
(a) by sample;
(b) by description formulated by the retail seller; or
(c) by description made by a person other than the retail seller,
there is an implied warranty,
(d) by the retail seller in a case to which clause a or b applies; or
(e) by the manufacturer and retail seller jointly in a case to which clause c
applies,
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product includes description by advertisement or by label or
associated with product orally or in writing.
This subsection compels the seller and manufacturer to stand
behind their descriptive labels and advertisements. However, it has
always been the assumption in Canadian law that a retailer actually
adopts the descriptive parts of labels as his own label when he
displays the goods which he sells. 20 Although this problem has not
been fully explored in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence, there have
been American decisions which suggest that the retailer's liability is
limited to the descriptive material on a label, and does not extend to
warranties or guarantees accompanying the goods if these
warranties or guarantees emanate from the manufacturer.
21 It
should be noted that the Bill does not abolish this distinction despite
the OLRC's positive recommendation that
. . . in a consumer sale, promises or affirmations of fact made on
the label or container or otherwise accompanying the goods shall
be deemed to be part of the description of the goods, or otherwise
an express warranty by the seller, whether the labels or containers
originated from the seller or not. 22
Section 6 deals with the warranty of fitness for purpose
6. (1) There is an implied warranty by the retail seller to the
retail buyer of a consumer product that the consumer product is
reasonably fit for the particular purpose for which it is required,
unless the circumstances are such as to show that the retail buyer
did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for the retail buyer to
rely, on the retail seller's skill and judgment.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a particular purpose for
which the consumer product is required includes not only an
unusual or special purpose but also a normal or usual purpose.
This warranty of fitness provision is an improvement on the English
Sale of Goods Act2 3 which still represents the basic position in
common law Canada. 24 The condition of fitness is no longer
confined to sales where the goods are of a description which the
seller supplies in the course of his business. In addition, the Ontario
Bill removes the proviso that the condition of fitness will only be
to the retail buyer that the consumer product corresponds to the description or
sample
20. OLRC Report at35
21. Cochran v. McDonald (1945), 161 P. 2d 305 (Wash. S.C.)
22. OLRC Report at 35.
23. Supra, note 5.
24. For example, see Sale of Goods Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 274; The Sale of
Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.421
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implied where the buyer makes the particular purpose known to the
seller so as to induce reliance. Subsection 2 provides that a
particular purpose for which the consumer product is required,
includes a normal purpose as well as an unusual one. Although this
does little more than restate the existing law going back as far as
Wallis v. Russell,25 it is nevertheless to be welcomed.
Section 4 of the new Bill deals with the crucial implied warranty
of merchantability, which is renamed "the warranty of acceptabil-
ity."
4. There is an implied warranty by the manufacturer and retail
seller jointly to the consumer of a consumer product that,
(a) the consumer product and its components will perform
for a reasonable length of time, having regard to the price and
all surrounding circumstances;
(b) the consumer product is in such an actual state that a
buyer fully acquainted with the facts and therefore knowing
what hidden defects exist would buy it for all purposes for
which the consumer product is normally used without
abatement of the price obtainable for such consumer product
if in a reasonably sound state or without special terms unless,
(i) the retail seller or manufacturer has disclosed to the
retail buyer defects in the consumer product or that the
consumer products are not suitable for all purposes for
which they are normally used, or
(ii) the defect should have been apparent to the consumer
where he has examined the consumer product prior to
purchase, or
(iii) it is common knowledge among the consumers that
the particular consumer products are not suitable for all
such purposes.
This section incorporates Lord Pearce's dissenting opinion on the
test for merchantability in Kendall v. Lillico:
26
[the goods] should be in such an actual state that a buyer, fully
acquainted with the facts and therefore knowing what hidden
defects exist and not being limited to their apparent condition
would buy them without abatement of the price obtainable for
such goods if in a reasonable sound order and condition and
without special terms .... 27
25. [1902] 2 I.R. 585 (C.A.)
26. [1969] 2 A.C. 31 at 118; [196812 All E.R. 444 at 486 (H.L.))
27. Lord Pearce adopted the test as set out by Dixon J. in Australian Knitting Mills
Ltd. v. Grant (1933), 50 C.L.R. 387 at 413
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Although section 4(b) above adopts a great deal of this test
verbatim, it gives additional guidance on contentious issues which
are of particular importance to the consumer.
First, the condition of merchantability is expanded to require
durability for a reasonable period of time, having regard to the price
and other circumstances. It is also interesting to note that the price
paid by the buyer is given an important role in determining whether
the goods are merchantable or "acceptable" in - terms of the
language of this Bill. This means that, although the goods supplied
under the contract may be commercially saleable, they will not be
merchantable if they are only saleable at a lower price. The test here
is therefore a stricter test than that adopted by the majority in
Kendall which was later approved in B.S. Brown and Sons Ltd. v.
Craiks. 28 However, it is unlikely that the courts will disregard the
logic of the Brown case completely. The mere fact that the
consumer simply made a bad bargain should not enable him to
complain that the product is unmerchantable or "unacceptable".
Secondly, the section advantageously expands the definition of
merchantability in Kendall v. Lillico29 by extending the warranty of
merchantability to "all purposes for which the consumer product is
normally used". 30 The section also has the virtue of placing the
burden on the retailer or manufacturer to warn the consumer that the
goods are not fit for all of their regular purposes. It will be recalled
that according to the Kendall test, goods are still merchantable if
suitable for some, or even one, of the purposes for which they are
normally used, despite the fact that they may be unfit for other
normal purposes. It is also important to note that section 4 does not
confine the condition of acceptable quality to sales in which the
seller is a dealer in goods of the relevant description but extends it to
all sales of consumer products.
Section 8 of the Bill makes disclaimer clauses void:
8. - (1) Any term or acknowledgment whether written or
otherwise and whether part of the agreement of sale or
not, that purports to negative, exclude, restrict or
diminish any warranty under this Act (or the
availability or scope of any remedy otherwise
28. [197011 W.L.R. 752; [19701 1 All E.R. 823 (H.L.) where the House of Lords
held that the goods will still be merchantable unless the buyer can only resell them
at a substantially reduced or "throw-away" price.
29. [196912A.C. 31; [196812 All E.R. 444.
30. An Act to provide for Warranties in Sale of Consumer Products, Bill 110, Ont.
30th Legislature, 3rd Sess. 1976 s. 4(b)
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available for the breach thereof) is void and of no
effect and, if a term of a contract, is severable
therefrom, and such term or acknowledgment shall not
be evidence of circumstances showing an intent that
any of such warranties are not to apply.
This reflects the prevalent attitude that the consumer seldom, if
ever, bargains from a position of equal strength. At present,
consumers may contract out of their common law rights without
either understanding what they are giving up, or without being able
to acquire a better bargain elsewhere. Not only does Section 8 (1)
disallow the exclusion of the warranties imposed by the Act, but it
also disallows any restriction on the "availability or scope of any
.. . remedy for breach". One concern that arises immediately is
that the welcome change brought about by Section 8 will be watered
down by Section 4 which allows the retailer or manufacturer to
render the warranties inapplicable by disclosing defects in their
products. For instance, the disclosure rule will do nothing to
advance the regime of free bargaining which this Bill seeks to
preserve. The section therefore does not regulate situations where
the supplier has a monopoly or where several suppliers have agreed
to sell their goods subject to the provisions of an industry-wide
standard form contract. 31 One can only hope that the courts will
restrict the effect of the disclosure exception to situations of specific
and informative disclosure as distinct from a generalized enumera-
tion of defects in a standard form contract. If not, "disclosure
clauses" could quite conceivably open the door to many of the
undesirable features of disclaimer clauses which the Bill has taken
such pains to outlaw. In this respect, the Bill has clear benefits. For,
disclaimer clauses are not only rendered ineffective, but are actually
prohibited:
(2) No person shall include in a written agreement anything that
purports to be a term or acknowledgment that is void and of no
effect under Subsection 1.
This prohibition is reinforced by a penalty in Section 12(1).
31. SeeHennignsen v. Bloomfield Motors (1960), 161 A. 2d 69 (N.J.S.C.) where
the plaintiffs wife was injured as a result of a steering defect in a new car he had
bought for her. The car was covered by a manufacturer's warranty, in lieu of all
others, which was the uniform warranty of the Automobile Manufacturers'
Association to which all major auto manufacturers belonged. The Court refused to
enforce the manufacturer's attempted disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability because it was unreasonably against the public interest in that it
was too wide and far reaching.
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12. (1) Every person, who, knowingly,
(a) contravenes Subsection 2 of Section 8; or
(b) gives an express warranty that is in contravention of a
regulation made under Clause A of Section 11,
is guilty of an offence and on summary conviction is liable to a
fine of not more than $5000.00 or to imprisonment for a term of
not more than one year, or to both.
Section 8 (3) forces retail sellers and manufacturers to stand
behind representations made by their salesmen:
(3) Any act or representation by an employee or agent of a retail
seller or manufacturer having apparent authority shall be
deemed to be an act or representation of the retail seller or
manufacturer.
This provision links up with Subsection (2), which jettions the parol
evidence rule inrelation to consumer transactions:
(2) In the trial of an issue under Subsection (1), oral evidence
respecting the facts necessary to establish an implied or express
warranty is admissible notwithstanding that there is a written
agreement and notwithstanding that the evidence pertains to a
representiation or undertaking that is or is not provided for in
the agreement.
However, it should be noted that the legislature did not adopt a
related recommendation by the OLRC that the retailer should not be
able to deny the authority of any employee to vary the terms of the
written document by means of a clause in the agreement. 32 Reading
Sections 8 (1) and 8 (3) together, the Bill seems to achieve this
effect anyway; although it would have been better if the draftsman
had said it aloud.
What of the damages provided for the breach of these warranties?
Section 9 (3) provides as follows: -
(3) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the estimated
loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of
events from the breach of warranty.
This is the measure of damages as set out in sales legislation
throughout Canada. 33 The provision reflects the common law
contractual measure of damages as laid down in Hadley v.
Baxendale34 and recently restated in Koufos v. Czarnikow Ltd. 35 It
32. OLRC Report at 30.
33. For example, see Sale of Goods Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 274, s. 51 (2); The
Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 421, s. 51(2)
34. (1854), 9 Exch. 341; 96 R.R. 742; 23 L.J. Ex. 179
35. [1969] 1 A.C. 350; [1967] 3 All E. R. 686 (H. L.)
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is pertinent to observe that the Bill has chosen this limited
contractual measure of damages to express the new extracontractual
liability which it has created, rather than the comparatively
generous tortious measure. 36 Moreover, this is entirely appropriate
when one considers that the vast majority of defective goods are
merely useless rather than dangerous. It should be noted, for
example, that the Uniform Commercial Code draws this kind of
distinction between the tortious and contractual levels of damage. 37
Yet, it seems likely that, despite the Bill, courts will continue to
apply a generous, tort-like measure of damages to consumer claims
involving personal injury both in and out of privity of contract.
III. The Privity Problem
The privity aspects of the Bill constitute its most important reform
which involves a radical departure from the Canadian approach to
products liability. For, it extends the responsibility for breach of the
warranties to the manufacturer, notwithstanding the absence of
privity of contract with the consumer. The objections to the
Canadian privity rule are well known. As was mentioned above,
manufacturers are entirely insulated from economic loss claims
unless they happen to have a direct contractual relationship with the
consumer, and provided that the retailers who have this direct
relationship are absent from the jurisdiction, insolvent, or otherwise
judgment-proof. The Bill makes the manufacturer jointly liable with
the retailer for breach of the implied warranties of description
(s.3(2)), merchantibility (s.4) and availability of parts and service
(s.5). In addition, Section 7 (2) provides that the manufacturer is
36. This is the test as set out inHuges v Lord Advocate, [1963] A. C. 837; [1963]
1 All E. R. 705 (H. L.); The Wagon Mound (No. 2), [1967] A.C. 617; [1966] 2 All
E.R. 709 (P.C.) (N.S.W.) and Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. [1962] 2 Q.B. 405;
[1961] 3 All E.R. 1159. That is, all damages, the general type of which is
reasonably foreseeable, are recoverable.
37. Section 2-715(2):
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.
It will be noted that the tortious or "generous" measure of damages in (b) is made
dependant on the presence or absence of injury, not the presence or absence of
contractual privity.
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also jointly liable with the retailer for any express warranty whether
written, published or broadcast.
However, the OLRC also recommended that the manufacturer
should be liable for sale by sample, title, and fitness for purpose.
Sales by sample are not at all unusual in the carpet industry where
the manufacturer supplies the samples to the retailer. Manufacturers
should also have to warrant fitness for purpose in two circum-
stances; (a) where the manufacturer is told by the retailer that the
goods are needed by the consumer for a specific purpose, or, (b)
where a special purpose is indicated by the manufacturer in his
advertisements. 38 The Bill does not give effect to these recommen-
dations. For better or for worse, the manufacturer's warranties still
do not parallel those of the seller.
The idea of making the retailer and manufacturer jointly and
severally liable is a sound recommendation. The consumer ought to
have the option of bringing his action against either the seller or
manufacturer or both. There is a suggestion resulting- from the use
of the word "jointly" in Sections 3, 4 and 7 of the Bill that a
consumer could not bring an action solely against one or the other,
but this problem is remedied by Section 10 (1):
Where by this Act the retail seller and manufacturer give a
warranty jointly, the retail seller and all manufacturers of the
consumer product are jointly and severally liable under Section 9
but as between themselves, in the absence of any contract,
express or implied, each is liable to make contribution and
idemnify each other in the degree in which they are respectively
found to be responsible for the creation of the circumstances
leading to the creation of the warranty and its breach.
It becomes clear, thus, that the consumer can recover his whole loss
from either the manufacturer or the retailer regardless of any
contractual allocation of responsibility between the latter two.
A major objection to this Bill is the fact that it still does not give
small businessmen or other "non-consumers" along the distributive
chain any recourse in the absence of privity of contract. 39 Granted,
the position may well be complicated by the presence of disclaimers
38. OLRC Report at 70-71
39. Mazetti v. Armour (1913), 135 P. 633 (Wash. S.C.) The plaintiff was
operating a restaurant and bought canned meat, manufactured by the defendant,
from a wholesaler. It was served to a patron who became ill. As a result the plaintiff
lost business, reputation and profit. The general rule was that there was no liability
on the part of manufacturers in these cases except where the consumer was injured
by an "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous product. The Court held,
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between merchant sellers and buyers. Yet, there is no reason to
deprive the courts of an opportunity to adjudicate upon the
conscionability or propriety of disclaimers accompanying the goods
simply because the plaintiff and defendant are not in contractual
privity with one another. Is there any real reason for requiring the
plaintiff to be a consumer before he is permitted to overcome the
outmoded privity barrier?
IV. Used Goods
A buyer of used goods should be entitled to receive goods that a
reasonable buyer would expect. The Bill does not permit the
exclusion of the statutory warranties in the sale of second hand
goods. However, Section 4 does allow the court to consider price
and other relevant criteria in defining the extent of the warranty of
acceptability. The OLRC agreed that the concept of merchantibility
was flexible enough to apply to used goods and that it was not
necessary to permit the exclusion of statutory warranties and
conditions in this category. However, as regards the flexibility of
Section 4 (acceptability), it was considered desirable to insert a
special provision to this effect in the Bill.
4 0
V. Conclusion
Products liability specialists will recognize immediately that this
Bill was designed to give effect to the dramatic judicial revolt
against the privity barrier in the United States which started in the
late fifties and still provokes heated controversy and voluminous
academic comment today.
Despite the shortcomings of this Canadian proposal, it is
ironically a far truer restatement of these exciting judicial events
than § 402(a) of the Restatement of Torts (Second), which attempts
to preserve the privity barrier in economic loss cases, by restricting
its effect to personal injury or property damage. 41
however, that in the absence of an express warranty of quality, a manufacturer of
food products under modem conditions impliedly warrants his goods when
dispensed in original packages and that such warranty is available to all who may be
damaged by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of trade.
It is obvious that this plaintiff could not have succeeded anywhere in Canada,
even today, and even under the Ontario Bill.
40. OLRC Report at 39
41. R. Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? (1974), 2 Hofstra L. Rev.
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